

New Data on UN Mission Mandates 1948–2015: Tasks Assigned to Missions in their Mandates (TAMM)

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journals.sagepub.com/home/jpr**Gabriella Lloyd** *Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland*

Abstract

Tasks Assigned to Missions in their Mandates (TAMM) provides comprehensive new data on the mandates of UN missions between 1948 and 2015. Until now, datasets have described mandates in terms of their influential characteristics, such as whether they are robust or multidimensional, or placed them into broad categories driven by idiosyncratic theoretical expectations. Despite limitations on data availability, mandates have been tied to numerous outcomes related to peacekeeping effectiveness. TAMM meets the need for flexible, minimally processed, and fine-grained data on mission mandates by recording the full range of tasks in mandates. The dataset comes in mission-resolution and mission-month versions that are designed to complement existing data on peacekeeping and to be easily adaptable to a wide range of research interests. In this article, I introduce TAMM and use the data to conduct a replication and expansion of Hultman, Kathman and Shannon (2014). I find evidence that missions with mandates that dictate they provide security guarantees and raise the costs of fighting, reduce battlefield hostilities.

Keywords

mission mandates, peacekeeping, United Nations

Introduction

This article presents new data on UN mission mandates. Until now, datasets on mission mandates have described them in terms of their influential characteristics, such as whether they are robust or multidimensional, or placed them into broad categories driven by idiosyncratic theoretical expectations. Despite the limitations on data availability, mission mandates have been tied to numerous outcomes related to peacekeeping effectiveness, including one-sided violence (Hultman, 2010), peacekeeper misconduct (Nordås & Rustad, 2013) and fatalities (Bellamy, 2014; Henke, 2018), the duration of peace (Fortna, 2008; Howard, 2019), and democratization (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006).

Tasks Assigned to Missions in their Mandates (TAMM) provides comprehensive new data on the mandates of UN peace operations between 1948 and 2015. The dataset comes in two forms. The mission-resolution version contains every UN Security Council resolution that authorizes or changes a mission's mandate and

describes all the tasks assigned. The mission-month version provides these data in a monthly format containing all months between the passage of each mission's initial mandate and the mission's termination.

I begin by discussing previous data collection efforts on UN mission mandates and explaining why we need more fine-grained data on the topic. Following that, I describe the procedures I use to collect data on mission mandates and summarize global and temporal trends in mandates. The trends reveal that mandates are highly diverse and becoming more complex, detailed, and ambitious. I then demonstrate the utility of TAMM by replicating and expanding Hultman, Kathman & Shannon (2014). I find evidence that missions with mandates that dictate they provide security guarantees and raise the costs of fighting, reduce battlefield hostilities.

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Motivation

Despite ongoing efforts to collect data on UN peacekeeping,¹ only limited data have been collected on mission mandates. Most existing studies describe mandates in terms of individual theoretically relevant characteristics, such as whether they are robust, multidimensional, or prescribe the use of force or protect civilians or women (Henke, 2018; Howard, 2015; Hultman, 2010; Karlsrud, 2015; Nordås & Rustad, 2013). Others distinguish between different types of mandates, but do so with the goal of assessing idiosyncratic theoretical expectations and sometimes conflating mission mandates with the number and type of peacekeepers deployed (Doyle & Sambanis, 2006; Fortna, 2008; Mullenbach, 2017; Howard, 2019).

TAMM makes four improvements on existing data on mission mandates. First, to my knowledge, it is the first to provide data on the full range of tasks assigned in the mandates of UN peace operations. Unlike other datasets that prioritize certain tasks or place missions into broad categories, TAMM provides researchers with minimally processed, fine-grained, and comprehensive data on the tasks in mandates. This design allows researchers to prioritize or group tasks as necessary to best test their original theories on the causes and consequences of mission mandates.

Second, TAMM makes a conscious effort to identify only the tasks assigned to missions without regard for other aspects of their implementation, such as their size and composition. Other data collection efforts tend to conflate these features of missions, for instance identifying a mission's purpose as maintaining law and order and protecting civilians, at least in part, on the basis of the presence of military troops or civilian police (Mullenbach, 2017). TAMM keeps these aspects of missions separate, recording just the tasks assigned in their mandates irrespective of the number or types of personnel deployed to implement them.

Third, TAMM provides unique insight into the time-varying nature of mission mandates. Most existing data on mandates are collected at the operation level. This data structure overlooks the fact that mandates expand and contract numerous times throughout the life cycle of most missions. TAMM captures this by recording the tasks assigned in each mission's initial mandate and any tasks added or subtracted in subsequent ones. The resulting data provide new insights into the evolving objectives

of UN missions and allow scholars to explore how changes in mandates affect and are affected by evolving preferences in the international community and needs of host countries.

In an effort to make TAMM easy to use, I provide two time-varying versions of the dataset: one at the level of mission-resolution and another at the level of mission-month. The mission-resolution dataset records all tasks assigned in each Security Council resolution, including the initial mandate and any expansions or contractions. The mission-month dataset expands these data to span all months between the initial resolution authorizing the mandate and the mission's termination per the UN Department of Peace Operations' website. Both datasets record the year, month, and day a new mandate comes into effect. They also contain Correlates of War country codes for all the countries to which each mission is deployed; for multistate missions, the first country code is for the country housing the mission's headquarters.

These features make TAMM a flexible resource for producing new and nuanced insights into the consequences of mission mandates, including their effects on peacekeeper, battlefield, and civilian fatalities; the duration of peace and intensity of fighting; the success of post-conflict elections and other reconstruction endeavors; and their relationships with other aspects of mission implementation. The data can also be used to answer new questions about the international and domestic conditions driving the assignment of specific mandates to missions.

Fourth, TAMM can also be used to produce new data-driven indicators of the nature of the tasks in mission mandates. The conventional approach to coding mandates is to record a '1' for missions whose mandates belong to a certain type – e.g. multidimensional, consent-based, enforcement, peacebuilding, robust, or observer – and a '0' otherwise. Each of the 48 tasks in TAMM are likewise represented with binary variables equaling 1 if they are assigned to missions and 0 if not. While TAMM therefore allows scholars to proceed as usual, it also facilitates the creation of novel, non-binary indicators of mandate characteristics. This includes factor variables that correlate with latent traits of mandates, variables that indicate the number of tasks in a mandate and their specificity, and variables that denote what proportion of a mandate is dedicated to certain kinds of tasks, like peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and violence limitation. I demonstrate the utility of these variables for theory testing in the replication and expansion of Hultman, Kathman & Shannon (2014) later in the article.

¹ Kathman (2013), Henke (2017), Cil et al. (2019).

The data

Definitions and variables

TAMM provides intuitive, fine-grained data on the mandates of all missions (formally called peace operations) deployed by the United Nations between 1948 and 2015. This includes the 51 missions managed by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations between 1992 and 2015, the 20 missions deployed by the UN during the Cold War, and the Africa-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic, which was established by the Security Council but led by the African Union.

A mission's mandate includes the full range of tasks assigned to a mission by the UN Security Council. Once ratified by the Security Council, a mandate comprises the formal legal foundation of that operation. While the Council considers input from formal and informal consultations with Permanent Missions, delegations, and other branches of the UN system, the Council is the sole UN body with the authority to define mandates (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2019; Wood, 1998).

TAMM records the official acronym of each mission, the Security Council resolution establishing or changing its mandate, and the year, month, and day that resolution passed. It includes each mission's initial mandate and any resolution that expands or contracts that mandate in the future.

TAMM identifies the tasks assigned in each resolution. A *task* is an action that relates to some actor, institution, or process; every task contains a noun and a verb (e.g. monitor the ceasefire, protect human rights, etc.). Tasks are represented with binary variables equaling 1 if they are assigned to missions and a 0 if not. Ten of these indicate which, if any, organizations, agencies, or operations UN missions are mandated to cooperate with. Scholars must decide for themselves whether and how to aggregate these variables to best test their theories.

Tasks are situated in nested categories that begin broad and get as specific as necessary. The broadest tasks in mission mandates, which I call first-order tasks, are those that do not serve solely to modify another broader instruction. Subtasks, which include second- and third-order tasks, are those that always appear alongside some first-order task and contain specific instructions on how to implement that task – e.g. monitor a ceasefire or peace agreement *by* monitoring the buffer zone or protect human rights *by* preventing violence against civilians. By definition, a mission that receives a 1 on a subtask always receives a 1 on the corresponding broader task. For example, resolutions that ask peacekeepers to

prevent sexual violence or protect civilians are always identified as protecting human rights. This is not necessarily true vice versa: missions that are tasked with protecting human rights may or may not carry mandates specifying that they should prevent sexual violence or protect civilians. Since all missions are mandated to do something, the number of first-order tasks ranges between 1 and 19 with mean 7. Not all mandates contain subtasks, however, allowing the number of subtasks to range between 0 and 11 with mean 3. The total number of tasks ranges between 1 and 29 with mean 10.

Figure 1 lists the tasks identified in TAMM, highlighting the first-order tasks in light grey and the subtasks in a darker grey. I have further grouped them into three unshaded substantive categories based on the hourglass model of conflict resolution: peacekeeping, peacebuilding, and violence limitation (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2011).² These categories do not impact how the tasks are coded, they are just present to make navigating them easier.

TAMM also contains ten non-task variables. The first three summarize the number and specificity of tasks in mandates: *totaltasks* counts the total number of tasks assigned; *numtasks* counts the number of first-order tasks; and *subtasks* counts the number of second- and third-order tasks. The second three describe what proportion of a mission's mandate pertains to peacekeeping, peacebuilding, or violence limitation. *Pkrat* describes the ratio of tasks in a mission's mandate related to conventional peacekeeping. This includes tasks related to observation, interposition, and maintenance during ceasefires or peace agreements that help prevent relapse into war. *Vlimrat* provides the ratio of tasks focused on ending continuing violence, including efforts to constrain, mitigate, and alleviate the intensity of fighting and violence, such as the protection of civilians and enforcement of peace. *Pbrat* shows the ratio of tasks related to peacebuilding, which include the 'positive' tasks of the stability and normalization phases of postwar reconstruction that help construct a self-sustaining peace, including holding elections, reforming the security sector, disarming, demobilizing, and reintegrating combatants, and promoting national reconciliation (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse, & Miall, 2011). As ratios, *pkrat*, *vlimrat*, and *pbrat* always range between 0 and 1 and add up to 1.

² I use the term 'violence limitation' instead of 'war limitation' to reflect the fact that the UN often implements the tasks in this category in postwar, but not post-violence, environments.




Figure 1. Tasks Assigned to Missions in their Mandates (TAMM)

The final four variables are factor scores generated using exploratory factor analysis and the mission-resolution dataset. The number of theoretical combinations of tasks vastly outpaces the number of existing combinations. Between 1948 and 2015, the Security Council assigned 48 tasks to just 72 missions in 151 resolutions. If it regularly assigns specific combinations

of tasks, then there is probably some set of underlying, or latent, traits of UN mission mandates that could be the basis of analytically useful types. I uncover these latent traits using a data reduction procedure called exploratory factor analysis (EFA), which evaluates the extent to which multivariate data can be expressed along fewer dimensions or factors. To avoid the computational errors

likely with a variable-to-observation (v:n) ratio of 5 or lower,³ I limit the variables included during EFA to the first-order tasks and combine all variables related to cooperation into a single variable (*cooperate*). This yields a ratio of about 7 (22:151).

Several diagnostic tests indicate that these task variables are suitable for factor analysis. The results of the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin test ($KMO = 0.8$) suggests that there is sufficient variance in tasks that could be caused by latent traits to warrant factor analysis. Bartlett's test of sphericity justifies rejection of the null hypothesis that the tasks are not interrelated ($p = 0.000$). I employ the Kaiser rule, retaining the four factors with eigenvalues greater than one, keeping in mind that there exist many more complex decision procedures for identifying relevant and reliable composites.

The factor loadings, or correlation coefficients between the tasks and latent factors, are suggestive of intuitive latent traits of a considerable proportion of mandates.⁴ First, the protection and monitoring of human rights and provision of humanitarian assistance all have large positive loadings on factor 1, suggesting that this factor describes mandates whose goal it is to protect vulnerable populations. Other tasks associated with factor 1 involve the creation of environments in which civilians will be safer, including implementing disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), reforming the justice sector and strengthening government capacity, enforcing peace (through the UN Charter's Chapter VII authorizations), and protecting UN personnel. Factor 2 is strongly correlated with UN engagement in elections: monitoring, executing, and securing free, fair, and peaceful elections all load highly on this factor. Factor 3 corresponds to tasks that restore sovereignty and territorial integrity, including monitoring the border and the exploitation of natural resources and assisting with refugee flows and de-mining. Factor 4 corresponds to mandates constructed around the goal of state-building, correlating highly with mandates to improve government capacity, reform the justice and security sector, and promote national reconciliation. To reflect the fact that each factor appears to be driven by influential tasks from an individual subcategory of peacebuilding or violence limitation, I label factor 1 the 'human security' factor, factor 2 the 'elections' factor,

factor 3 the 'national security' factor, and factor 4 the 'state-building' factor.

The four factor variables (factor1, factor2, factor3, and factor4) in TAMM contain the regression score estimates with oblique promax rotation.⁵ These are composite variables based on the factor loadings described earlier that place each observation on a scale for each of the four unobserved latent traits. The numerical values (aka factor scores) are estimates of how close a mission's mandate is to the latent type reflected in that factor. A higher positive score indicates that a mission's mandate better represents a latent type and a lower negative score indicates an especially poor standing on that factor. Each factor variable has a mean of 0 and standard deviation of 1. Scores of zero are average and indicate that a mandate does not lean strongly towards or away from the relevant factor.

Figure 2 illustrates the spread of the mandates in TAMM across the four factors in the mission-resolution dataset. I have added a vertical jitter to make the mission names more readable; mandates' vertical positions within the factors do not provide any information about their relative positions. It is normal for missions to appear multiple times in different locations within a single factor as the Security Council adjusts their mandates over time.

Data collection procedures

I created TAMM by coding the initial UN Security Council resolutions authorizing each mission, as well as any subsequent resolutions adjusting the mandate. In order to identify the full range of tasks assigned to UN missions, I employed an inductive coding procedure in which I created a new category for each task assigned to missions in their mandates. Each time a new task entered the dataset, I recorded a set of coding rules for the future. Anytime a new task appeared that had no pre-existing counterpart per the coding rules, I created a new corresponding task. Lists of resolutions pertinent to missions were obtained from the UN Department of Peace Operations' website.

While contemporary Security Council resolutions clearly outline missions' activities in their host countries, early resolutions tended to ratify mandates described in advisory reports from other branches of the UN system, such as the General Assembly or Secretariat. In these cases, I recorded the tasks assigned to missions in these

³ C.f. Pearson & Mundform (2010).

⁴ I provide a table containing the factor loadings and a scree plot containing the eigenvalues in the Online appendix.

⁵ The rotation accounts for the fact that the factors are correlated (correlation matrix shared in Online appendix).




Figure 2. Factor regression score estimates

Note: Mission labels omitted for mandates in middle 90%

reports. In rare cases when the relevant documents could not be located online, I relied on information on mandates published on the official website of the UN Department of Peace Operations.

This inductive coding procedure, which ensured that the tasks identified in TAMM would not be clearly defined before data collection, did introduce a potential source of bias in the early stages of this project. I mitigated this risk with support from graduate research assistant, Roya Izadi, who used the codebook to code every resolution independently. She compared her dataset with mine, flagging all discrepancies as type 1 or 2 errors, and identified any missing, redundant, or confusing tasks. I reviewed her notes and reconciled all issues. I have since reviewed the coding procedures and checked all coding decisions on two separate occasions, most recently in January 2020.

There are limitations to what these data can tell us about a mission's role in a host country and how prepared it is to carry out the assigned tasks. Variations in size, composition, and finances can result in missions with similar mandates but different capabilities. Missions with similar mandates also adapt differently to the needs of local populations, while psychological and emotional stress factors, poor personnel management, and negative public relations can all strain the ability of a mission to

Table I. Size and variability of mission mandates, by region

Region	Number of missions	Average number of mandate changes	Average number of tasks
Africa	30	1.57	9.1
Asia	9	1.00	6.6
Europe	10	1.30	6.0
Middle East	13	0.15	4.3
North and South America	9	0.89	4.9
Full sample	72	1.11	7.3

fulfill its mandate (Howard, 2008). The data in TAMM should therefore not be used to construct the whole picture of missions' roles in host countries, but instead to produce insight into missions' formal mandates.

Trends and patterns

Table I summarizes how often mandates change and how many tasks they contain, breaking the summary statistics down by region. It shows that the average mandate contains about seven tasks and the average mission experiences one mandate change during its deployment. This varies by region, however, with missions in Africa receiving the largest mandates and undergoing the most

changes. Missions in the Middle East, by contrast, have the smallest and most stable mandates, with an average number of changes near zero.

Figures 3 and 4 illustrate temporal changes in mission mandates, highlighting the emergence and subsequent dominance of large mandates and the growing relevance of the latent types captured by the factor variables. During the Cold War, the number of tasks in ongoing missions' mandates peaked at 8 and averaged 1.6. Between 1992 and 1999, the tasks in mandates surged, peaking at 18 and averaging 5.5. Between 2000 and 2015, the

number of assigned tasks peaked at 29 and averaged 12. Narrow mandates containing few tasks continued to be assigned during this period, but in increasingly small numbers. The percentage of new mandates with 4 or fewer tasks dropped from 93% during the Cold War to 24% between 1992 and 1999. Between 2000 and 2015, the Security Council created one new mandate (assigned to UNSMIS) with four or fewer tasks, although 9 other ongoing missions with older mandates meeting this criterion persisted into this time period.

Mandates are not just getting larger, however: they are also becoming more detailed. As Figure 3 shows, while the number of first-order tasks assigned in mandates has increased, so has the number of subtasks accompanying them. As tasks that provide additional information on how the UN would like peacekeepers to pursue the vaguest objectives in their mandates, subtasks may have the potential to positively impact the daily activities and operations of peacekeepers in an era of increasingly large and ambitious mandates. If subtasks help peacekeepers prioritize and implement objectives that are otherwise unclear in nature or intension, then their inclusion should be advantageous for peacekeeping effectiveness. Whether subtasks fill this role is an open question, but recent research suggests that they do reduce the likelihood that missions with large mandates will incur




Figure 3. Temporal variation in mandate size




Figure 4. How well the factor variables represent mission mandates over time

Table II. Correlation matrix of composite and ratio variables

	<i>Factor 1</i>	<i>Factor 2</i>	<i>Factor 3</i>	<i>Factor 4</i>	<i>Vlimrat</i>	<i>pbrat</i>	<i>pkrat</i>
<i>Vlimrat</i>	0.51	0.01	0.45	-0.08	1		
<i>Pbrat</i>	0.08	0.32	-0.01	0.62	-0.27	1	
<i>Pkrat</i>	-0.47	-0.28	-0.35	-0.46	-0.57	-0.64	1

peacekeeper fatalities from malicious violence (Lloyd, n.d.). Without TAMM's nested architecture, however, the unique informational contributions of subtasks to mandates would likely be overlooked.

Figure 4 illustrates temporal changes in how well the factors derived from the exploratory factor analysis describe mandates. It clearly shows that the latent types identified during EFA speak better to the post-Cold War era; missions' mandates tended to be poor representations of these types during the Cold War, but rapidly became better representations in the years after it ended. This makes intuitive sense, since the composite variables are largely driven by tasks generally associated with post-Cold War peacekeeping endeavors, such as assisting with elections, ensuring human security, and reforming state institutions.

Why is conventional peacekeeping – and more broadly the Cold War era – so poorly represented in composite variables generated using EFA? I believe this is a result of the tension between the purpose of EFA, a data reduction technique, and the size of conventional peacekeeping and Cold War era mandates. Of the 47 resolutions that rank below 0 on all four factors simultaneously, 44 contain three or fewer first-order tasks. Scholars do not need the composite variables to identify these mandates, which can be effectively identified using the individual task variables in TAMM.

The variables *vlimrat*, *pbrat*, and *pkrat* provide alternative indicators of the overall nature of mandates for those that wish to go beyond binary variable construction but seek variables that cope better than the factor scores with small mandates. These variables are related to binary indicators that classify missions as engaging in violence limitation, peacebuilding, or peacekeeping, but more detailed in that they communicate what proportion of the tasks in a mission's mandate is dedicated to these three objectives. Their straightforward construction may make them easier to interpret for some than the factor variables, but users should keep in mind that they convey less information than the composite variables about the nature of the assigned tasks. For instance, as shown in Table II, *vlimrat* is correlated with factors 1 and 3 because tasks related to human and

national security make substantial contributions to these factors, but overlooks the concomitant roles played by certain peacebuilding and peacekeeping tasks. *Pbrat* is highly correlated with factor 4, but also moderately correlated with factor 2 because it cannot distinguish mandates focused on promoting elections from those focused on other elements of peacebuilding like security sector reform. *Pkrat* is negatively correlated with all four factors, likely for the reasons already discussed (see Table II).

Replication and expansion

To demonstrate the potential of these data for statistical analysis, I use TAMM in a replication and expansion of Hultman, Kathman, & Shannon (2014), hereafter HKS. HKS propose two mechanisms by which a stronger UN presence reduces warring parties' incentives to engage in battlefield violence: by providing credible security guarantees that enable credible commitments and raising the costs of fighting by reducing opportunities for battlefield encounters. They use monthly dyadic data on battle-related deaths during post-Cold War civil wars in Africa and UN mission composition to show that battle hostilities between governments and rebels decline as the number of UN troops present increases.

I argue that mission mandates have a power similar to that of mission composition to dictate the capacity of a peace operation to provide credible security guarantees and raise the costs of fighting. Missions with mandates to enforce peace, limit violence, and ensure human and national security are deployed with the right and responsibility to provide security guarantees to civilian and combatant populations and to use force as necessary to reduce opportunities for battlefield encounters. Assuming these mandates translate into distinctive peacekeeper strategies that pursue these objectives, then missions with Chapter VII authorizations allowing the use of force, mandates that contain a large proportion of tasks dedicated to violence limitation, and mandates that more closely approximate the human and national security latent types should be in

Table III. Effect of mission mandates on battlefield deaths in civil wars in Africa, 1992–2011

<i>Variables</i>	<i>(1) Base</i>	<i>(2) Tasks</i>	<i>(3) Factors</i>	<i>(4) Ratios</i>
UN troops t-1	-0.130 (0.051)*	0.029 (0.054)	-0.013 (0.051)	-0.064 (0.046)
UN police t-1	0.227 (0.195)	0.020 (0.234)	0.302 (0.246)	0.265 (0.186)
UN observers t-1	2.732 (1.344)*	0.225 (1.423)	3.079 (1.694) [†]	3.309 (1.130)**
Ceasefire	-0.075 (0.389)	-0.773 (0.381)*	-0.446 (0.335)	-0.424 (0.345)
Rebel strength	0.385 (0.303)	0.339 (0.256)	0.440 (0.283)	0.546 (0.267)*
No. of rebel groups	0.009 (0.063)	0.133 (0.069) [†]	0.088 (0.065)	0.086 (0.063)
Population (ln)	0.063 (0.188)	0.013 (0.161)	0.045 (0.171)	0.119 (0.171)
Biased intervention	1.413 (0.420)**	1.746 (0.437)**	1.531 (0.440)**	1.744 (0.433)**
Battle deaths t-1	0.009 (0.002)**	0.009 (0.003)**	0.010 (0.003)**	0.010 (0.003)**
Chapter VII authorization		-3.291 (0.804)**		
Monitor or assist peace agree. or ceasefire		2.387 (0.903)**		
Monitor, assist, or secure elections		1.189 (0.882)		
Monitor borders		-0.050 (0.650)		
Assist security sector reform		0.415 (0.809)		
Monitor or assist DDR		-1.701 (0.694)*		
Factor 1			-1.136 (0.404)**	
Factor 2			0.346 (0.575)	
Factor 3			-0.639 (0.423)	
Factor 4			-0.020 (0.332)	
Violence limitation ratio				-2.553 (1.258)*
Peacebuilding ratio				5.378 (1.709)**
Total number of tasks				-0.085 (0.063)
Constant	1.151 (2.130)	1.246 (1.918)	0.939 (2.012)	0.004 (1.978)
Ln(alpha)	2.816 (0.146)**	2.774 (0.140)**	2.784 (0.141)**	2.774 (0.142)**
Wald χ^2	62.90**	163.39**	109.26**	105.50**
Conflict dyads	145	145	145	145
<i>N</i>	5,861	5,861	5,861	5,861

Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered on conflict dyad. [†] $p < 0.1$; * $p < 0.05$; ** $p < 0.001$.




Figure 5. Predicted number of battle deaths with 95% CIs

Note: All other covariates held at means

unique positions to provide security guarantees and raise the costs of fighting.

Hypothesis: When the UN assigns mandates to missions to enforce peace, limit violence, and promote human and national security, battlefield violence decreases.

I test this argument using the replication materials obtained from J. Kathman's website and the original data in TAMM. I make no changes to the original research design except for the inclusion of the new monthly mandate data. As in the original analysis, the dependent variable is a count of battle-related deaths and the estimation technique is negative binomial regression. I start by replicating the main initial findings from Table I, Model 1 of HKS. I then estimate three additional models that add binary task indicators (Model 2), the factor variables (Model 3), and the violence limitation and

peacebuilding ratio variables (Model 4).⁶ All of the mandate variables equal zero when no UN personnel are present. The results are shown in Table III.

The findings in Model 1 are an exact match for those in Table I, Model 1 of HKS: as the number of UN troops increases, battlefield violence decreases. When I include the data from TAMM, I find similar negative relationships between battle-related deaths and missions with Chapter VII authorizations (Model 2), mandates that are better representations of the human security latent type captured by factor 1 (Model 3), and mandates with higher proportions of tasks dedicated to violence limitation (Model 4). The only surprise is that factor 3 (the national security factor) is not significantly associated with battlefield violence. I suspect this is because the tasks that correlate with this factor, which include monitoring borders and the use of natural resources and assisting with de-mining, are less effective at producing credible security guarantees and raising the costs of fighting than the tasks that correlate with factor 1, which include Chapter VII authorizations, protecting human rights, providing humanitarian assistance, and improving government

⁶ Model 4 excludes *pklim* because the three ratio variables add up to 1.

capacity. Thus, while factors 1 and 3 are both driven by tasks related to violence limitation, they have different impacts on battlefield hostilities. When it comes to providing security guarantees and raising the costs of fighting, the form of violence limitation matters.

One unanticipated but important finding is that accounting for mandates renders the effect of UN troop size statistically insignificant. While this article is not an appropriate venue for a deep dive into the effects of UN troop components, the findings suggest that the benefits of deploying more UN troops identified by HKS could be spurious and due to the strong positive correlation between the number of UN troops and Chapter VII authorizations (0.82); factors 1 and 3, namely, the human and national security factors, (0.78 and 0.66, respectively); and the ratio of tasks dedicated to violence limitation (0.67).

Figure 5 illustrates the substantive importance of mission mandates. Holding all other covariates at their means, the predicted number of battle fatalities declines considerably during missions with Chapter VII authorizations; the same decline is apparent as missions' scores on factor 1 and the ratio of tasks in their mandates related to violence limitation increase.

To assess the robustness of these findings, I re-estimate these models with conflict-level fixed effects and cubic time trends and with additional controls for trends in violence, the presence of regional interventions, and the timing of resolutions. I also re-estimate the models using the matched sample generated by HKS using one-to-one propensity score matching without replacement. The results, shared in the Online appendix, indicate just one change to the substantive findings: when estimated using the matched sample (shown in Table AIII), the extent of a mission's mandate dedicated to violence limitation has no effect on the number of battle deaths; this finding is likely less robust than the others because *vlimrat* does not distinguish between missions with different types of violence limitation mandates.

That the seemingly similar variables included in this analysis yield different findings highlights the usefulness of these data for theory-testing. By going beyond surface-level similarities, TAMM reveals differences in mandates that have important consequences for peacekeeping effectiveness. By substituting existing blunter indicators with the nuanced data made available in TAMM, scholars will produce better tests of their causal mechanisms.

Conclusion

This article presents a new dataset on UN mission mandates called Tasks Assigned to Missions in their


Mandates (TAMM). Until now, scholars have focused on identifying important characteristics of mandates, such as whether a mission's mandate is robust or multi-dimensional, and classifying missions into broad categories. Considerable evidence generated as a result of these efforts suggests that understanding mandates is critical to understanding peacekeeping effectiveness. TAMM represents an effort to move the state of knowledge forward by identifying all tasks assigned to all UN peace operations in their mandates. The dataset spans 1948–2015 and comes in two versions: a mission-resolution version that contains every UN Security Council resolution that authorizes or changes a mission's mandate and a mission-month version that contains these data for all months between a mission's initial authorization and last operational month.

I began by making a case for why we need more fine-grained data on UN mission mandates, describing the procedures I followed for collecting such data, and summarizing the variables this procedure generated. Following that, I discussed major trends apparent in the data, which indicate that mandates have become more complex, detailed, and ambitious. I then demonstrated the utility of the data in TAMM by showing that the UN can reduce hostilities during active conflicts by ratifying mandates that order missions to provide warring parties security guarantees and raise the costs of fighting. The results demonstrate the usefulness of TAMM for exploring the impacts of mandates on the conflict-affected countries that host them.

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Replication data

The replication data and do files, along with the Online appendix, are available at <http://www.prio.org/jpr/data> sets and <http://www.gabriellalloyd.com>. All analyses were conducted using Stata 16.

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